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Abstract 
This paper investigates how lineages, the commonly found organizations in rural villages of China, 
affect people’s intra- and cross-lineage cooperative behavior.  We use data from the Chinese 
Household Income Project Survey 2002, which exclusively contains information about the lineage 
structure in these villages allowing us to classify three levels of lineage-based heterogeneity.  Our 
identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of lineage-based heterogeneity. We find evidence 
that people in a village with higher lineage-based heterogeneity are less likely to exhibit reciprocity 
behavior within lineages or contribute to the provision of public goods that are jointly shared across 
lineages. The estimation results remain robust to the inclusion of various control variables and 
additional background characteristics.  Finally, we examine a number of other economic outcomes 
and find that more homogenous villages do better than other types of villages. 
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1. Introduction 
Developing countries, including China, make tremendous efforts to promote rural development 
and reduce poverty.  Because the success of many economic endeavors, such as the exchange of 
goods and services and the provision of public goods depend on cooperation, understanding the 
nature of cooperative behavior is of vital importance.  In developing areas where formal contract 
enforcement is often weak, informal institutions such as lineages, tribes, or castes guide people’s 
behavior.  In rural Chinese villages, for example, lineage solidarity, which is based on concepts of 
family and shared patrilineal descent, still plays an important role in providing informal institutions 
of accountability (Tsai, 2007).  However, different villages have different lineage structures and 
therefore are more or less heterogeneous.  This paper seeks to understand how an informal 
institution like clan lineage influences cooperation by examining villages with varying degrees of 
lineage-based heterogeneity. 
Existing studies have associated heterogeneity, including ethnic, linguistic, religious and tribal 
heterogeneity, with trust (Alesina et al., 2002), economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997), 
provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999) and the quality of governance (La Porta et al., 
1997).  Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the effects of lineage-based heterogeneity 
on both intra- and cross- lineage cooperative behavior simultaneously in the same villages in rural 
China.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents a full picture of cooperative 
behavior by examining both intra-group and cross-group cooperation.  Bowles and Gintis (2008) 
state that cooperation can take the form of mutually beneficial transactions that may fail to 
materialize without trust and reciprocity (intra-group), or it can take the form of the providing 
public goods, which requires agreement and collective action (cross-group). Lineage networks 
play an important role in institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces 
enforcement cost, and social organizations spanning groups have a comparative advantage in 
facilitating cross-group cooperation. In this paper, we measure intra-group cooperation by the 
frequency of mutual help in monetary and non-monetary terms that occur between most familiar 
individuals while varying the lineage homogeneity across the villages of these individuals. Cross-
group cooperation is measured by individual contributions to build village infrastructure and by 
the share of the village budget that is spent on village public goods.  With this setup, we exploit 
not only both individual and village level variations but also the comparison between intra-and 
cross-lineage cooperation.  
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We begin by examining intra-group cooperation.  Empirical studies on intra-group cooperation 
are rare.  Conflict theory in sociology suggests that diversity fosters in-group solidarity as well as 
out-group distrust (Blalock, 1967).  However, Putnam (2007) claims that the fundamental 
assumption behind the conflict theory: in-group trust and out-group trust are negatively correlated 
– is essentially unwarranted.  In other words, bonding with own-group members is not necessarily 
at the cost of bridging with other groups.  Putnam (2007) further argues that there might be the 
possibility that diversity actually reduces both in-group solidarity and out-group trust and presents 
some evidence from the United States.  Thus, having heterogeneity in the lineage structure of the 
villages allows us to see how the composition of the village and the extent of the presence of other 
groups in the village affect intra-group cooperation. Our results support Putnam’s hypothesis 
where we find that more homogeneous villages demonstrate greater cooperation – just the 
possibility of repeated interaction within your own group can lead to more cooperation. 
There is a large body of literature studying the impact of heterogeneity on the provision of 
public goods.  The findings generally indicate that heterogeneity in ethnicity, religion or social 
class undermines cross-group cooperation and the provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; 
Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005; Bandiera et al., 2005).    In this paper, we present evidence 
that villages that are more heterogeneous in terms of lineage spend a lower share of the village 
budget on village public goods and villagers contribute less labor to build village infrastructures.  
These findings are consistent with the burgeoning studies emphasizing the importance of tribal 
structures.  For example, Fukuyama (2011) provides new insights into China’s development and 
argues that it was shaped by two forces working in tandem: legalism and Confucianism.  One of 
the great constants in Chinese history is the importance of family, kinship and lineage ties for the 
social fabric or organization.  While legalism sought to centralize the state, Confucianism 
supported patrimonial power and the importance of the family enabling the two forces to reinforce 
each other.  Although at certain periods one force may dominate the other, they were not in conflict 
and work together to shape China’s transition.  In rural China, local governments bear almost 
complete fiscal responsibility for local public good provision (Oi, 1996; Tsai, 2000).  Before the 
1980s, village leaders in rural China were generally appointed by the upper levels of the 
government. Because of increasing conflicts between leaders and villagers over taxes and fees, the 
Organic Law of Village Committees (draft) was first implemented in Guangxi province at the end 
of 1980 (Fan, 2001; He et al., 2001).  This law laid out comprehensive provisions for the election 
4 
 
of village committees so that villagers were able to elect their own leaders (Zhang et al., 2004).  
This institutional shift not only improved the efficiency of local governance but also improved the 
efficiency of public spending (Zhang et al., 2004; Wang and Yao, 2006; Brandt and Turner, 2007; 
Luo et al., 2010).  On the other hand Xu and Yao (2015) document that informal institutions such 
as the lineage culture facilitate local governance.   
A general concern in the literature is that the residential sorting process is endogenous (Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2002; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). However, in our analysis the 
village composition is independent of economic activities (Coleman, 1994; Peng, 2004).  In other 
words, the identification strategy of this paper relies on the assumption that the lineage structure 
in a rural village, measured by surname patterns, is exogenous to cooperative behavior. 2  Shortly 
after communist China was founded in 1949, the central government established administrative 
villages to strengthen the party’s rule and to build the commune system. 3   Administrative villages, 
the lowest level of administrative unit in China, also serve as the lowest rung of collective farming 
in the commune system.  To meet the needs of collective farming, administrative villages included 
one or more adjacent lineages (Wang, 2006). Therefore, the lineage composition within a village 
was exogenously determined by a shock – that of China’s administrative re-organization.  In 
addition, in 1958, China enacted the household registration system, which inhibits free migration 
and essentially ties rural people to the land where they were born.  Thus, the lineage structure in 
rural villages has remained stable since 1958 (Solinger, 1999).   
Using data from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) 2002, we find that 
lineage-based heterogeneity has a negative effect on both the frequency of monetary and non-
monetary mutual help.  It turns out that villagers do not treat them differently with regard to lineage 
obligations and enforcement.  Our results show that lineage-based heterogeneity has a negative 
effect on cross-lineage cooperative behavior as well.  In other words, people in lineage-
homogenous villages are more likely to engage in reciprocal behavior with their lineage members 
and more likely to contribute to the provision of public goods that are jointly shared across lineages.  
                                                          
2 Despite the possibility that over time cooperative behavior may lead to larger families, this is unlikely to be a serious 
concern for us.  In her seminal study of surname groups Tsai (2007) notes that surname patterns were largely 
determined exogenously in the pre-communist period by imperial land settlement policies and natural disasters.  
Moreover, the post-communist period of around fifty years is not long enough to have had a sizable impact on the 
population growth of cooperative families. Moreover, our heterogeneity variable is defined by village composition 
instead of lineage sizes.  As we explain later, the village border is exogenously determined by the central government.  
3 The goal of the reorganization was to facilitate the penetration and concentration of the Communist regime but did 
not take into account the common interests of the villages. 
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Importantly, we provide additional support for the rice cultivation and cooperative behavior 
hypothesis since the association between the lineage-based heterogeneity and the cooperative 
behavior is stronger in the South.  This also offers us more confidence regarding the causal effect 
of lineage-based heterogeneity.   
Our results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables and additional background 
characteristics.  The effect of lineage-based heterogeneity on cooperation are likely to imply 
different economic outcomes in those villages after years of development.  To explore the impact 
of lineage-based heterogeneity on those villages’ economic outcomes, we investigate the villagers’ 
total financial assets at the end of 2002, income from farming, fishing and forestry, the percentage 
of rural-urban migrant workers from each village, and the existence of a junior high school in each 
village.  The results generally suggest that the lineage culture not only fosters cooperation, but also 
improves economic outcomes over time.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide some background 
information. Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 demonstrates the identification strategy and 
the empirical models. Section 5 discusses the results.  The last section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 Lineage Networks in rural China 
A substantial existing literature explores the relationship between ethnic groups and economic 
development.4  In China, there are a total of 56 ethnic groups, and the Han makes up the vast 
majority of the total population – around 91.6 percent.  Among the other 55 minority ethnic groups, 
44 occupy their own autonomous regions and the largest one is the Zhuang which consists of 
around 1.3 percent of the total population (Dincer and Wang, 2011).  While there is not much 
variation in ethnicity in China, rural villages provides an ideal setting for the study of lineage 
groups.5   Being exposed to similar social shocks at the provincial or national level, these villages 
have enough variation in lineage composition (Xu and Yao, 2015) to make them useful units of 
observation. 
                                                          
4 See for instance Alesina et al., (1999); Alesina and La Ferrara, (2000); Alesina et al., (2001); Fearon and Laitin, 
(2000); Luttmer, (2001); Miguel and Gugerty, (2005); Putnam, (2007). 
5 We do not take urban regions into account, because the lineage culture does not have much impact on urban life 
after 1949 (Freedman, 1958). 
6 
 
In the long history of China, lineage culture has been a major driving force behind different 
forms of social interaction from conflicts to cooperation and reciprocity. Lineage culture dates 
back hundreds of years.  Extended families related to the male’s line living in one settlement and 
form a lineage.  All men in one lineage were descendants of a common ancestor.  Male members 
hold primary power in political leadership, moral authority, and social benefits. In short, the social 
structure is patriarchal.  Therefore, while female members could be from other ethnicities, lineages, 
or villages, male members from the same lineage have the same surname and are consequently 
from the same ethnicity.  In imperial China, rural organizations and communities were in fact the 
outgrowth of lineages.  The size of the lineage ranged from a handful to a few hundred households.  
Over generations, the common surname became the lineage identity and promoted solidarity 
among lineage members (Peng, 2004).  Lineage heads and sub-heads played a crucial role in rural 
governance and were responsible for community affairs, public goods, rules and regulations for 
lineage members and so on.  Thus, lineage identity brought loyalty with it.  Lineage members were 
closely-bonded and held rituals to worship the same ancestors regularly (Tsai, 2007). They were 
willing to contribute to, or sacrifice for the benefit of the entire lineage.   
Different from some other traditional groups in the world, lineage organizations were preserved 
in rural China even after radical social changes and are still one of the most important informal 
institutions in the countryside.  While the data is incomplete, Huang (1985) indicates as late as the 
turn of the twentieth century most of the villages in the south were composed of members of one 
lineage.  In imperial China, the formal government was hardly able to reach rural areas (Kuhn 
2002).  After communist China was founded, Party Secretaries and Villagers’ Committees started 
to tighten control over villagers and take on the power to manage village affairs.  To reach this 
goal, the communist regime reorganized lineages by establishing administrative villages without 
considering historical and traditional boundaries of these lineages and their common interests 
(Wang, 2006).  As a governing unit, an administrative village may include one or more adjacent 
lineages.  Lineages still play a significant role in cooperative actions such as resolving conflicts, 
cooperation, and coordination, especially in southeastern China (Weber 1981, 1951; Freedman, 
1958).  Some qualities of lineage members such as familism, kinship loyalty and moral obligations 
(Whyte, 1995; Peng, 2004) still persist. They hold rituals and plan collective activities regularly.  
In the meantime, lineages are making efforts to share power with the formal government.  For 
example, according to a six-month fieldwork carried out by Tsai in 316 villages between 1999 and 
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2001, the obligations to contribute to the good of the lineage groups provide incentives for public 
good provision. Greif and Tabellini (2015) argue that clans resumed their role in promoting mutual 
aid, securing their own benefits as well as contributing to public goods. Xu and Yao (2015) find 
that village leaders from larger lineages considerably increased local public good investment.           
     Freedman (1958) finds that lineage groups act as a substitute in places where formal institutions 
are weak.  He also finds that the lineage culture is stronger in the South of China than in the North 
and proposes three reasons to explain the difference.  Firstly, the South is farther away from formal 
government control since the political center of China is located in the North.  This provides a 
basis for the lineage culture to thrive in the South.  Second, rice-cultivation in the South demands 
extensive irrigation.  Inter-household cooperation in irrigation could be the base from which the 
lineage organizations emerged.  Third, the population in the South has many immigrants from the 
North.  The exigencies of frontier life could stimulate the development of lineages.  Talhelm et al. 
(2014) offer another possible explanation for the lineage culture to thrive in the South – the history 
of farming rice in the south needs cooperation in extensive irrigation while in the North wheat 
farmers can rely on rainfall.  The need for irrigation fosters lineage-based rural organizations since 
lineage members’ stronger reciprocal and moral obligations could enforce cooperation.  The 
Yangtze River in China splits the wheat-growing north from the rice-growing south.  Talhelm et 
al. (2014) point out the percentage of cultivated land devoted to rice paddies is more than 50 
percent in each province in the rice-growing south (below the Yangtze River). In a follow up study 
using incentivized experiments, Zhou (2017) finds greater cooperation among students from the 
Southern provinces of Hunan and Zhejiang than from students of the Northern provinces of Hebei 
and Shandong. 
 
2.2 Local Governance and Public Investment in Rural China 
In rural China, local governments bear almost complete fiscal responsibility for local public goods 
provision (Oi, 1996; Tsai, 2000).  Before the 1980s, village leaders were generally appointed by 
the upper levels of the government. Because of increasing conflicts between leaders and villagers 
over taxes and fees, the Organic Law of Village Committees (draft) was first implemented in 
Guangxi province at the end of 1980 (Fan, 2001; He et al., 2001).  This law laid out comprehensive 
provisions for the election of village committees so that villagers were able to elect their own 
leaders (Zhang et al., 2004). Since then, village elections were promoted all over the country.  
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However, this promotion did not run smoothly. In most of the villages, committee members were 
still appointed by the upper levels of government. According to the National Fixed-point Survey 
conducted by the Research Center of Rural Economy in China, by 1994, only half of the villages 
had started the election process.  In 1998, the revised version of the Organic Law of Village 
Committees was officially passed by the National People’s Congress and elections quickly spread 
to villages all over the country. Wang and Yao (2006) report that since 1998, pure government 
nomination has disappeared and the incidence of electing local leaders is now fully established.  
   Key differences between leaders appointed by the upper levels of government and leaders 
elected by the local villagers lie in the degree of decentralization, participation, and accountability 
(Dethier, 2000).  They are also important for monitoring the delivery of public goods and services.  
Zhang et al. (2004) are among the first to investigate how this institutional shift in village 
governance affected public good provision.  They find that elected leaders tend to spend more on 
local public goods since elections have impose accountability in decision-making.  They also 
suggest that when decisions are made by the village committees rather by one or two individuals, 
the efficiency of public spending is higher perhaps because of the reduction in wasteful spending 
by village leaders.   
     Nevertheless, the institutional environment in China is not especially friendly towards the 
democratic process.  The upper levels of government often intrude in village elections and village 
affairs creating a conflict for local leaders who may now have to satisfy both their local constituents 
as well as the upper echelons of government.  This has led some to question whether the elected 
leaders truly serve the will of the villagers.  To provide concrete answers, Wang and Yao (2006) 
study the impact of village elections on the accountability of the village committee, local fiscal 
sharing, and state taxation in rural China. They find that elections substantially increase the share 
of public spending in the village budget, but reduce the shares of administrative costs and income 
handed to the upper levels of government. These findings suggest that elections have enhanced the 
accountability of the village committees, but weakened local fiscal sharing and the state’s grip.  
Luo et al. (2010) provide another explanation for the accountability of the selected leaders by 
testing the potential mechanism behind the consistent relationship between elections and public 
good provision.  They find that the re-election incentives affect the behavior of incumbents even 
in an early democratization situation, because the voters only reward good leaders.   Brandt and 
Turner (2007) find that even very corrupt elections can provide strong incentives for elected 
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leaders to act in interest of their constituents. Kennedy et al. (2004) use a sample from Shaanxi 
province and compare government-appointed candidates with candidates who were nominated by 
villages.  They find that nominated village leaders were more accountable to villager's decisions 
regarding land reallocations.  
 
2.3 Why lineage composition matters?   
Different from other solidarity groups, lineage group obligation is based on the concept of family. 
In this sense, intra-lineage cooperation is important in two ways.  Firstly, usually the households 
in a lineage have been clustered in a settlement for generations, and this long-term connection as 
well as the repeated nature of their interaction (possibility of needing help in the future) provides 
them with incentives to help other lineage members (Coate and Ravallion, 1993).  Second, 
choosing not to help a lineage member would be like choosing to be disowned or to be denied 
other lineage benefits by being ostracized (Basu, 1986).  Moreover, the obligation may be stronger 
as the size of the lineage increases (Pan, 2012).6   In a large lineage where everyone knows 
everyone else due to clustering over generations, a deviant may be denied future exchanges not 
only with the person in need of assistance but also with many other lineage members as in Bloch, 
Genicot and Ray (2008).  In other words, the cost of defection potentially rises as the size of the 
lineage increases.  Consequently, reciprocity will be more often in large lineages than in small 
lineages.  We note that the size of a lineage in a homogeneous village, on average, is greater than 
a lineage in a heterogeneous village. Thus, we hypothesize there is more frequent intra-lineage 
reciprocity in homogenous villages than in heterogeneous villages.   
For cross-lineage cooperation like public good provision, there are two streams of literature 
investigating the relationship between social capital and public good provision. One is related to 
informal institutions, explained by accountability, obligation and moral standing.  Tsai (2007) 
proposes a model of informal governmental accountability to explain public good provision in 
rural China. Local officials have the incentive to provide public goods if villagers assign them 
higher moral standing for doing so.  In a more homogeneous village, the village leader is more 
likely to be from the large lineage.  Being in the large lineage, village leaders can earn authority 
conferred by their lineage members and provide public goods for the good of their group (Tsai, 
                                                          
6 According to Posner's (1980) study of institutions in primitive societies, the reciprocity among lineage members can 
be regarded as a form of implicit contract that says, “I help you today because I expect you to help me tomorrow”.   
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2007; Xu and Yao, 2015).  If they are not from the large lineage, they are less able to guarantee 
the provision of public goods. The other one is related to formal institution.  Alesina et al. (1999) 
claims that ethnic groups have different preferences even over a seemingly neutral public good.  If 
there are many distinct preferences across groups, the chosen type of public goods is not preferred 
by a large fraction of the population (Alesina et al., 1999).  The costs of heterogeneity come from 
the inability to agree on the common public goods (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).  In that case, 
individuals contribute fewer resources to public goods, because a large fraction of their resources 
are used to provide public goods that are shared with other groups (Banerjee et al., 2001).   
One has to pay attention to the fact that the institutional background in rural China is mixed. 
A recent study in the context of rural China by Padró-i-Miquel et al. (2015) investigates the 
interaction of the two theories and concludes that informal institutions like the lineage culture is 
actually the pre-condition that enhances the performance of formal institutions. In other words, the 
lineage culture and formal institutions are complements.  Thus, in a more homogeneous village, 
village leaders are more able to guarantee the provision of public goods.  Villagers increase their 
contributions because most of the beneficiaries of the public goods belong to their own groups.  
Moreover, if rural China is moving towards democracy, we can expect more public good provision 
because high social capital and formal institution compensates each other in this perspective. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use data from the rural part of the CHIPS 2002 survey.7  In this portion of the survey, 9200 
randomly-selected households were interviewed from 961 villages in 22 provinces.8  Figure 1 
presents a map of the provinces in China wherein the surveyed provinces have been shaded.  As 
explained in the previous section, the lineage culture is more developed in the South than in the 
North. To investigate how this cultural difference affects the results, we adopt the grouping 
strategy of Talhelm et al. (2014) and use the Yangtze River as the South-North divide to separate 
the 22 provinces into two groups: Southern provinces and Northern provinces.  As shown in Figure 
1, the darker shade denotes Southern provinces which include ten provinces are classified as being 
                                                          
7 Our analysis is based on three questionnaires – the household level main rural questionnaire, the village level 
questionnaire and the social network questionnaire. 
8 Although there are 34 province-level administrative units in China, the 22 provinces in the CHIPS 2002 data set 
provide a nationally representative sample. The 22 provinces were selected from four distinct regions in China – 
metropolitan, eastern, central, and western – to reflect variations in economic development and geography (Li et al, 
2008). 
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in the South, while the lighter shade denote twelve Northern provinces.9  To better focus on the 
lineage culture, we exclude minority ethnic groups from our sample, since they are historically 
herding areas and have different languages, cultures and religions (Talhelm et al., 2014). 
In our sample, individual-level questions were answered mainly by heads of households or 
other household members when household heads were not available.10  Those include questions 
about both the individuals and their families.  For each village, the village-level questions were 
answered by a village representative who was familiar with the geographic, demographic and 
economic characteristics of the village.  A village representative could be the party branch 
secretary, the head of the village committee, or the village accountant, whoever was available 
during the survey. In each village, around 10 to 15 families were surveyed.  Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for all variables that form the core of this analysis.  In the following subsections, 
we first explain how we measured lineage-based heterogeneity in our analysis, and we then discuss 
cooperative behavior.  
 
3.1 Three Types of Villages 
Although from our data we are not able to obtain the traditional heterogeneity index used in most 
existing literature, two village-level questions in the survey make it possible for us to categorize 
the 961 villages into one of three types based on the level of heterogeneity.11  The two questions 
are: 
 Q1. “Is the percentage of households belonging to the largest lineage in the village 
more than 50 percent?”   
 Q2. “Is the percentage of households belonging to the top five largest lineages in the 
village more than 50 percent?”   
In the sample, villages that answered “yes” to Q1 are defined as Type 1 villages.  Villages that 
answered “no” to Q1 and “yes” to Q2 are Type 2 villages.  Villages that answered “no” to both Q1 
and Q2 are Type 3 villages.  Thus, Type 1 villages are the most homogenous villages, as the 
majority of households in a Type 1 village are from the largest lineage.  Type 3 villages are the 
                                                          
9  The provinces in the “South” include Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou.  The provinces in the “North” include Beijing, Shandong, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Jilin, Henan, Shannxi, Gansu, Xinjiang and Shanxi.   
10 In the sample, about 97.8 percent of the respondents are household heads or their wives. 
11 The traditional heterogeneity index is a Herfindahl-based index as shown in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002, 2003) 
and Alesina et al. (1999).   
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most heterogeneous villages as each village consists of a number of small lineages.  Type 2 is a 
medium-type village.  Figure 2 provides a visual comparison of lineage structure for the three types 
of villages.  In our sample, 30 percent of the villages are Type 1 and 37 percent are Type 2. Table 
2 lists the percentage of each type for each province. 
An additional household-level question also provides lineage information:  
 “Does your family belong to the largest lineage in the village?”   
This question enables us to calculate the percentage of the sampled largest-lineage households 
in each village.  Our calculations show that, on average, 71 percent of the sampled households in 
Type 1 villages, 37 percent in Type 2 villages and 15 percent in Type 3 villages belong to the 
largest local lineage.  Note that Type 3 villages are the most heterogeneous villages while Type 1 
villages are almost twice as homogenous as Type 2 villages.  
We use Type 3 villages as the reference group and examine whether people in Types 1 and 2 
villages are more cooperative.  Therefore, we define two binary variables: TYPE1 and TYPE2.  
TYPE1 is equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to a Type 1 village, and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, 
TYPE2 is 1 if the respondent belongs to a Type 2 village, and 0 otherwise.    
 
3.2  Intra-lineage Reciprocity Variables 
Our analysis focuses on both intra- and cross-lineage cooperative behavior.  This section describes 
the construction of intra-lineage reciprocity variables.  To measure intra-lineage interaction, we 
rely on the following question from the CHIPS 2002 survey:  
 “How often do you offer the following types of mutual help to your relatives and 
neighbors?”   
The types of mutual help include (i) borrowing and lending money, (ii) helping with farming 
during the busy season, (iii) helping with house building, and (iv) caring for the elderly, the sick, 
and babies.  Because extended families in rural China are usually established in the immediate 
vicinity of each other in the same area (Holcombe, 1985; Ye and Wang, 2005; Wang, 2006; Greif 
and Tabellini, 2011; Xu and Yao, 2015), we can assume that the respondent’s relatives and 
neighbors are mostly from his/her own lineage and make use of the responses to the above question 
to proximate intra-lineage reciprocity. 12  Among the four types of help listed above, the first 
                                                          
12 Note that in the first type of village which is dominated by a single clan, it is highly likely that typical villagers 
would think of a member of their own lineage when they were asked the question involving “relatives and neighbors” 
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reflects monetary reciprocity while the other three capture the non-pecuniary favors, especially 
those favors that require an investment of time.  Therefore, we define two dependent variables: 
borrow and help to separate monetary from non-monetary reciprocities.  The binary variable 
borrow takes the value 1 if the respondent answered that borrowing or lending money occurs often 
or very often, and zero if the respondent stated that this mutual help occurs rarely or never.   
With regard to the other three types of mutual help, (ii), (iii) and (iv), we first construct a binary 
variable for each type in the same way as we did for borrow.  We then define help by summing 
the three indicators.  Hence, help takes values 0, 1, 2 or 3 where a greater number implies more 
mutual help regardless of the type of non-monetary help.  For example, 0 means that all the three 
binary help variables have the value 0.  That is, the respondent answered mutual help in all three 
types, (ii), (iii) and (iv), occurs rarely or never.  Conversely, 3, the greatest possible number for 
help, indicates all three binary variables take the value of 1.  That is, the respondent answered 
mutual help in types (ii), (iii) and (iv) occurs often or very often. 
 
3.3 Cross-lineage Cooperation Variables 
We now explain how to measure cross-lineage reciprocity.  A commonly used measurement of 
cross-group cooperation in the literature is the provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; 
Banerjee et al., 2005).  We adopt this idea by examining villagers’ physical effort in the provision 
of public goods and the share of the villages’ budgets spent on public goods.  Village public goods, 
such as irrigation facilities, roads, and schools, are jointly consumed by all villagers, regardless of 
their lineage membership.  Therefore, people’s willingness to invest in public goods reflects the 
cross-lineage reciprocities in any given village.   
Solidarity groups play a key role in providing local public goods across rural areas in China.  
During six months of fieldwork in 1999 and 2001 respectively, Tsai (2002) discovered the 
widespread phenomenon that village officials rely on informal institutions such as lineage groups 
to fund and manage public services.  Before 2002, all villagers (between the ages of 18 and 65) in 
China were required by law to provide unpaid labor to build local public goods, such as irrigation 
                                                          
simply because of their larger numbers. Indeed there is clear evidence that the lineage size is larger in these villages. 
Essentially friends who are not relatives would have to be a minority in such villages. Hence it would be a statistical 
anomaly for the average member in such villages to think of neighbors. Thus, to provide greater justification to our 
assumption, we apply the full models and compare the intra-lineage cooperative behavior between type 1 villages and 
other types (type 2 and type 3 together) of villages.  The relationship remains robust.  The results are not reported but 
are available upon request.   
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systems, dams, roads, and school buildings. 13  The number of regulated days of unpaid work 
varied from place to place, but was usually between 7 and 21 days per year.  If villagers could not 
physically participate in the unpaid work, they were charged fines for each day they missed.  The 
villages could then use the collected fines to hire other people to replace the missing workers.  
Since 2002, China has eventually waived this unpaid-labor duty and replaced it with “One-Issue-
One-Meeting”, which also allowed the village authority to raise funds and free labor from villagers 
to finance local public good provision in a more democratic way (Chen and Ma, 2014).  When 
CHIPS 2002 was conducted, this reform had still not been implemented in 140 of the 961 surveyed 
villages that provided us with data on the fulfillment of the unpaid-labor requirement. In these 140 
villages, each surveyed household reported the number of days that they were required to work for 
free and the number of days they actually completed in 2002.  Based on this information, we 
construct the variable fulfill, which is the ratio of the number of actually completed days to the 
number of required days, to measure the households’ physical effort in contributing to village 
public goods.  
        To investigate monetary contributions to public goods, we construct two additional village 
level variables using data from 961 villages across China: (i) share, which measures the share of 
the village budget spent on education, the medical system, and other common expenditures (i.e., 
expenditures for environmental protection and public safety) and (ii) sgrowth, which measures the 
change in the share variable from 1998 to 2002. 14   As the revised version of the Organic Law of 
Village committees was passed in 1998 and the election has then spread quickly to all the villages, 
we also construct the sgrowth variable to investigate how village elections affect the relationship 
between lineage-based heterogeneity and public good provision. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 This was mandated by the Regulations on Peasants’ Fees and Services (1992) announced by the State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China.  Before the tax-for-fee reform around 2002, households were required to supply labor 
for free to local authorities mostly for the construction of local infrastructure.  The number of regulated days varied 
with local needs.  Local authorities were responsible for enforcing this regulation.  The unpaid labor requirement 
should take place during the off-season for farming. 
14 In CHIPS 2002, public goods include education, infrastructure, health and other common expenditures but share 
excludes infrastructure investment in this paper.  In contrast to other public goods, infrastructure needs both money 
and labor investment from rural villagers because of the fact that funds from the upper echelons of government are 
usually not sufficient to cover the total spending for these public projects. Thus, the results would be biased if we 
included infrastructure in share while ignoring the labor contribution to it. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 lists all the variables used in our analysis.  The first column displays sample averages 
while the next two columns illustrate the means in the South and the North respectively.  The first 
panel documents our outcome variables of interest.  Consider borrow as an example.  We find that 
38.7 percent of the respondents in the South responded that borrowing and lending money occur 
often or very often while the number of the respondents in the North is 0.8 percent lower.   
We control for a set of village characteristics.  Approximately half of the villages are located 
in mountainous areas.  Because village location plays an important role in the prevalence of lineage 
culture (Freedman, 1965), we include other geographic controls, such as whether the village is 
located in a city suburb, the distance to the nearest transportation terminals, and the distance to the 
nearest county.  As irrigation is the most important form of long-term cross-lineage cooperation in 
rural China (Freedman, 1965), we control for this variable, denoted as CANAL98, which measures 
whether the village used a canal as the major irrigating method in 1998.  We find that 69.2 percent 
of the sample villages answered “yes” to this question.  In rural China, the village is led by a village 
head (the chairman of the Village Committee) and a party secretary, and the village economy 
depends heavily on village leadership (Oi, 1999).  Thus, the characteristics of village leaders are 
accounted for in our analysis.  Five measures are used, including the number of years the village 
leader has been in office, the age of the village leader, the education level of the village leader, the 
enterprise management experience and the experience of operating a non-agricultural family 
business.  
The last panel of Table 1 documents detailed characteristics of the respondents, or the 
respondents’ family.  Of the respondents, 16 percent were village cadres. 15  Villagers in rural 
China, on average, spent around seven years in school.  Following the study of Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002), we construct a PAST DISASTER variable that takes a value of 1, 2, 3 or 4.  A larger 
number indicates that the respondent suffered more natural disasters in the last five years (1998 – 
2002).  Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) include a similar indicator – “recent traumas”, in their model, 
which equals 1 if the respondent suffered a negative experience in the past year such as divorce, 
diseases, accidents, or financial misfortune and zero otherwise.  Their study shows “recent traumas” 
                                                          
15 “Cadre” means administrators in China.  In both Russia and China’s revolutionary eras, the word refers to a group 
of leaders active in promoting the revolution of the communist party.  It no longer has any revolutionary implications 
in today’s China (Pan, 2012). 
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has a negative impact on trust.  Due to data limitations, we do not have all the details on villagers’ 
past experiences, but only on disasters.  Thus, our analysis includes PAST DISASTER instead to 
determine if the number of disasters suffered by the respondent affects his/her cooperative 
behavior.   
 
4. Identification Strategy and Estimable Models 
Our main identification assumption is that lineage-based heterogeneity is exogenous with respect 
to either intra-lineage or cross-lineage cooperative behavior.  Prior to 1949, natural villages were 
mostly the outgrowth of lineages who had settled in a place for a long period of time.16 While the 
data is incomplete, Huang (1985) illustrate as late as the turn of the twentieth century most (as 
high as 87 percent) of the natural villages in the south were composed of members of one lineage. 
Recall that in a lineage, members are related to a male’s line so that male members hold primary 
power in political leadership, moral authority, and social benefits. In short, the social structure is 
patriarchal. Therefore, while married female members could be from other ethnicities, lineages, or 
villages, male members from the same lineage have the same surname.   
        Shortly after communist China was founded in 1949, the central government established 
administrative villages by including one or more adjacent natural villages geographically.  
Administrative villages were formed keeping two goals in mind. The first goal was to tighten 
control over lineages after the Communist regime came into power.  Administrative villages were 
established as one governing unit across lineages boundaries and did not take into account the 
lineages’ common interest.  Party penetration of villages was institutionalized and the Party branch 
replaced traditional village leaders such as lineage heads.  The party branch was identified with 
the interest of the party-state rather than lineage interests so lineage groups were not able to 
manipulate this process (Wang, 2006).  During the same period, many movements including the 
notorious Great Leap Forward was launched in China, and communist China began to collectivize 
farming.  Another goal of village re-organization was to be able to facilitate the gathering of the 
produce of farmers/peasants into the hands of the newly formed communist state. This has been 
documented by Kuhn (2002).  Therefore, the lineage composition within a village was 
exogenously determined by a shock – that of China’s administrative re-organization. 
                                                          
16 There were some exceptions --- some pre-1949 villages might contain multiple lineages because of other reasons 
like disasters, geographical conditions and so on. However, this does not affect our identification strategy.   
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        Selective migration from one village to another was not frequent because of the tight lineage 
bonds and the high moving costs (Freedman, 1958; Hsiao, 1960).17  Shrines and temples were built 
in each lineage to perform lineage worship and rituals, and to protect their members (Chang, 1955; 
Tsai, 2007).18   Following the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, about 20 million of people 
died in the famine (Becker, 1996).  Lineage members depended on each other to survive through 
the disasters.  In addition, in 1958, China enacted the household registration system, which inhibits 
free migration and essentially ties rural people to the land where they were born.19   Thus, the 
lineage structure in rural villages has remained stable since 1958 (Solinger, 1999). To provide 
additional evidence to support our results, in the robustness check section we add job 
characteristics dummies and working location dummies into the baseline model and check how 
these may affect our results.  
        Another concern could be whether cooperative behavior affects lineage structure in some 
unobservable way.  Previous studies provide some evidence to support our assumption suggesting 
that this is not a concern. For example, Coleman (1994) argues that lineage networks are 
established exogenously “for noneconomic purposes but with economic consequences”.  
Essentially, shortly after 1949, administrative villages were formed to meet the needs of collective 
farming, and to be better governed by the party branches.  Solinger (1999) points out during the 
Maoist period, strict policies against internal migration froze surname patterns in rural China, 
which were largely determined exogenously by imperial land settlement policies and natural 
disasters.  Peng (2004) also states that the village composition is independent of economic 
activities.  Tsai (2007) even uses surname pattern as an instrumental variable in her study of 
solidarity groups and local public good provision in rural China. It seems unlikely that the 
                                                          
17 According to a survey conducted by Lohmar et al. (2011) in over two hundred villages from nine presentative 
provinces in 1988 and 1995 respectively, about 0.5 percent of the rural labor force are rural-rural migrants in 1988 
and about 3 percent in 1995.  However, rural-rural migrations often occur because of marriage and family reunion 
(Poncet, 2006) type events.  Note that in China women typically move into their husbands’ villages if they are from 
different places. 
18 Though most of the shrines and temples were torn down during the Cultural Revolution, lineage members tried to 
rebuild them in the late 1970s.  They play an important role in the lineage religion (Tsai, 2007). 
19 The household registration system has been partially relaxed since the 1980s.  The surplus rural laborers pour into 
cities in search of non-agricultural jobs.  In China, rural-to-urban migration is non-voluntary, heavily regulated and 
controlled by the state (Chan et al., 1999; Poston and Yaukey, 1992).  Only official and approved migration ensures 
urban job opportunities, and accompanying subsidies and benefits (Mallee, 1995).  However, migration is granted 
only when it serves the state’s interests or policies (Chan et al., 1999). This makes permanent rural-to-urban migration 
difficult for rural workers. Most rural workers have to commute between cities and their original villages several times 
a year.  
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cooperative behavior (whether it be mutual help or public good provision) has had a significant 
impact on village structure.   
In the results section, we provide more empirical evidence for this assertion.  We use different 
types of villages based on lineage fragmentation to proxy heterogeneity. A variety of individual 
and village controls are added sequentially into the models to check the sensitivity of our estimates 
of interest.  The identification strategy assumes that conditional on the baseline controls, our 
measurement of lineage-based heterogeneity is not correlated with other unobserved factors that 
influence villagers’ mutual help and cooperation, and public good provision. To examine these 
possibilities, we conduct several additional robustness checks in the results section.  We use 
individual level models to examine intra-lineage cooperative behavior and villagers’ physical 
contributions to public goods.  These models are presented in subsection 4.1.  When we study the 
impact of lineage-based heterogeneity on the share of the village budget spent on public goods, we 
use village-level models presented in subsection 4.2.   
  
4.1 Intra-lineage specification 
Our basic model for intra-lineage relationships is  
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑝 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + 𝑌𝑗𝑝𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑝𝛾 + 𝛼𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑝     (1) 
where the subscripts indicate individual i in village j of province p.  The outcome variables are 
latent variables, or respondents’ motivation, for monetary and non-monetary intra-lineage mutual 
help.  Because borrow is a binary variable, we use a probit model to estimate the regression 
coefficients.  Help is a discrete ordinal variable.  More specifically, we classify the frequency of 
non-monetary help into 4 categories, with 3 thresholds.  Therefore, we use an ordered probit model 
to estimate the regression coefficients.   
    TYPE1 and TYPE2 are the village-type indicators.  𝑌𝑗𝑝 is a vector of other village characteristics 
that include net income per capita, and its squared form so that we are able to test whether the 
effect of per capita income on cooperative behavior is stronger or weaker as villages become 
wealthier.   𝑌𝑗𝑝  also includes indicators for mountainous area, suburb, distance to the closest 
transportation station, distance to the closest transportation terminal, poverty, total population, 
total planting area, as well as a binary variable indicating whether the village used a canal as its 
major irrigating method in 1998.  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑝 is a vector of individual characteristics, which include age 
and a quadratic form of age, so that we can examine whether the effect of age on cooperative 
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behavior is stronger or weaker as people grow older.  It also includes indicators for gender, years 
of schooling, marital status, cadre, household income, and family size, and binary variables 
indicating whether the individual belongs to the largest lineage in the village and the number of 
natural disasters he/she suffered in the past five years (1998-2002).   𝛼𝑝 is a vector of province 
fixed effects that rules out systematic differences between provinces.   
     If intra-lineage cooperation is more frequent in homogenous villages than in heterogeneous 
villages, then 𝛽1 > 0, and 𝛽2 > 0 .  The identification strategy in this paper arises from the 
exogenous predetermined heterogeneity.  We use model (1) to examine whether intra-lineage 
cooperation is more frequent in homogenous villages than in heterogeneous villages.  Because the 
lineage culture is traditionally more predominant in the South than in the North of China, to further 
refine our identification, we separate the entire sample into two subsamples – Southern provinces 
and Northern provinces.  We apply model (1) to each subsample and investigate whether the 
difference is stronger in the South than in the North.   If the answer is affirmative, this indicates 
that the lineage-based heterogeneity affects people’s cooperative behavior.  Moreover, it also 
suggests that our assumption regarding those in an individual’s neighborhood being from the same 
clan is a reasonable one.   
 
4.2 Cross-lineage specification 
The measurements of cross-lineage cooperation include fulfill, which is an individual-level 
outcome, and share and sgrowth, which are two village-level outcomes.  The models for the fulfill 
variable are the same as models (1) except that the fine charged for each missed day of unpaid 
work is also included in 𝑌𝑗𝑝, in addition to all other village characteristics.  The models for the 
share variable are as follows:  
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑝 = 𝛽3𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + 𝑌𝑗𝑝𝛿 + 𝛼𝑝 + 𝜀𝑗𝑝.      (2)  
If lineage-based heterogeneity discourages people from contributing to public goods, then 𝛽3,
and 𝛽4 > 0.  
In 1998, the revised version of the Organic Law of Village Committees was officially passed 
by the National People’s Congress and elections quickly spread to villages all over the country.  
Since then, elected village leaders were more accountable to villagers’ decisions.  In particular, the 
provision of public goods is now more aligned with villagers’ cooperative behavior.  Thus, when 
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sgrowth is the outcome variable, we aim at examining how the provision of public goods responds 
to this policy change.  The general model is: 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽5𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽7𝑇 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 ∗ 𝑇 + 
𝛽9𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑌𝑗𝑝𝑡𝛿 + 𝜀𝑗𝑝𝑡      (3) 
where 𝑇 is an year indicator. 𝑇 = 1 if the year is 2002; 𝑇 = 0 if the year is 1998. 
In 1998, the model can be rewritten as: 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑝,1998 = 𝛽5𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝+𝑌𝑗𝑝,1998𝛿 + 𝜀𝑗𝑝,1998.      (4) 
 
In 2002, we rewrite (4) as 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑝,2002 = 𝛽5𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽7 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 
𝛽9𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + 𝑌𝑗𝑝,2002𝛿 + 𝜀𝑗𝑝,2002.      (5) 
As 𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑝,2002 − 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑝,1998 , we obtain the following model for the variable 
sgrowth from (5) minus (4): 
𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝛽7 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸1𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸2𝑗𝑝 + ∆𝑌𝑗𝑝𝛿 + ∆𝜀𝑗𝑝      (6) 
where ∆𝑌𝑗𝑝 indicates the change of village characteristics from 1998 to 2002. 
        In a more democratic environment, people are granted more rights to participate in collective 
decisions.  Accordingly, we can expect public-good provisions to increase faster in a more 
homogenous village because people’s decision to cooperate could be better realized in 2002.  In 
other words,   𝛽8 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽9 > 0. 
 
4.3 Selection on Observables 
To mitigate the possibility that other background characteristics may be the driving the relationship 
between lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior. Now we examine whether our 
analysis has selection on observables.  To do this, we use the above models plus interaction terms 
between the type variables and the South/North Dummy (denoted by T1_S and T2_S).  Villager 
and village characteristics are the left-hand side variables.  We test whether those characteristics 
are different across the three types (evaluated by the coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2), and more 
importantly, whether those differences, if there is any, change from the South to the North 
(evaluated by the coefficients of T1_S and T2_S).  Table 3 presents the results.  Notice that the 
coefficients of TYPE1, TYPE2, T1_S and T2_S for the variable “SURNAME” are all significantly 
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positive.  “SURNAME” is a dummy indicator which is one if the individual is from the largest 
lineage in the village and zero otherwise.  The four positive coefficients indicate that people in 
Type 1 and Type 2 villages are more likely than Type 3 villagers to be from the largest local lineage, 
and this situation is more apparent in the South than in the North.  This exactly reflects that Type 
1 and Type 2 villages are more homogenous than Type 3 villages and the difference in lineage-
based fraction across types of villages is more dramatic in the South than in the North.  On top of 
that, we do not see other variables have the same pattern as SURNAME.  For the other variables, 
though the coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2 can be statistically different from zero, the 
coefficients of T1_S and T2_S are not.20  The results in Table 3 indicate that the three types of 
villages can be different in aspects other than the lineage-based fraction.  Yet the other differences 
do not change from the South to the North.     
 
5 Main Empirical Results 
In this section, we first explore how lineage-based heterogeneity affects intra-lineage cooperation 
and cross-lineage cooperation using our baseline models. The results are robust after we 
sequentially introduce a number of different controls.  We then provide additional evidence to 
support our analysis.  In addition, for the individual level model, we cluster the standard errors by 
village; for the village level model, we cluster the standard errors by county. 
 
5.1 Intra-lineage and Cross-lineage Cooperation 
Using model (1), we examine the impact of lineage-based heterogeneity on intra-lineage 
relationships. Our goal is to investigate whether borrow or help is more likely to occur in Type 1 
or Type 2 villages than in Type 3 villages.  The main regression results are reported in Table 4.  
Columns (1) and (4) illustrate the most basic regression results which compares the impact of the 
three types of village structure on intra-lineage cooperation in rural areas.  Columns (2), (3), (5) 
and (6) examine the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of additional individual and village 
controls that can potentially have an impact on cooperative behavior.  The results from column (1) 
to (3) show that the estimated relationship between lineage-based homogeneity and the frequency 
                                                          
20 Expect for the Age variable, one possible reason is that the One Child Policy is more strictly enforced in the North 
of China (Davis and Harrell, 1993). 
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of monetary mutual help is positive and significant, which is also robust to a variety of controls.  
To be more explicit, if we re-run regression (3) using a probit model, the marginal probit 
coefficients of TYPE1 and TYPE2 calculated at the means indicate that frequent monetary help 
among lineage members is more likely to occur in Types 1 or 2 villages than in Type 3 villages by 
9.3 and 6.7 percentage points, respectively. 21  The results from column (4) to (6) report similar 
results for non-pecuniary help.  Villagers from Type 1 or 2 villages are more likely to offer physical 
help to lineage members than villagers from Type 3 villages. 
Tables 4 also report the coefficients of several interesting individual variables.  First, borrow 
increases with age while help does not.  One explanation is that older people simply have more 
money to help.  Another explanation is that lending is less likely to occur if there is asymmetric 
information about the riskiness of the borrowers.  Because older people are more experienced and 
may have more information about other lineage members, they may be more likely to offer 
monetary help than younger people.  Non-pecuniary help, although it consumes time, is less risky.  
Asymmetric information plays a less important role here.  Similar explanations can be applied to 
the association between being a cadre and borrow/help.  Second, gender and marital status both 
have a significant negative relationship with borrow while their association with help is not 
significant.  This may indicate that in rural China, women or married villagers are more risk-averse. 
Third, the coefficients of HHINCOME are not significant for either monetary or non-monetary 
reciprocity within a lineage, thus, implying that it does not seem to be the case that people with 
larger monetary budgets tend to help other lineage members more, giving more credence to the 
asymmetric information explanation.  Cadre is positively associated with monetary help but not 
non-monetary help.  Asymmetric information is not an issue for a cadre because usually a cadre 
member possesses larger information networks. However, working for the government indicates 
they have less spare time to help others physically.  Both borrow and help are positively associated 
with family size.  Due to economies of scale, larger families may have more information about 
other lineage members and also have more people available to provide help.   
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Probit results are not reported here because linear models are more transparent and the clustering works better 
with linear models. The Probit results are available upon request. 
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5.2 Cross-lineage Relationships 
Next, we use model (2) to test whether homogeneous villages are more willing to contribute to 
public goods than heterogeneous villages and present the main results in Table 5.  The outcome 
variables are fulfill for columns (1) to (3), share for columns (4) to (5) and sgrowth for columns 
(6) to (7). Recall that fulfill is an individual-level outcome variable measuring the respondent’s 
physical contribution to public goods, while the other two outcomes are village-level outcomes 
regarding the share of the village budget spent on public goods.  So there are individual controls 
from columns (1) to (3).  Column (1), (4) and (7) illustrate the most basic regression results which 
compares the impact of the three types of village structure on cross-lineage cooperation in rural 
areas.  The other columns examine the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional 
village controls as same as those included in Table 4.  The results from Table 5 show that the 
estimated relationship between lineage-based homogeneity and collective action is generally 
positive and significant. This is also robust to a variety of controls.  To be more explicit, column 
(3) reports that Type 1 villages averagely completed more required unpaid labor days than Type 3 
villages by 8.9 percentage points but this coefficient is not significant.  Column (5) shows that 
Type 1 and Type 2 villages spend more of the village budget on public goods than Type 3 villages 
by, respectively, 3.9 and 3.3 percentage points. The estimated coefficient of TYPE2 is only 
marginally significant.  The above evidence indicates that cross-lineage cooperative behavior is 
more likely to occur in homogeneous villages than in heterogeneous villages.   
    Columns (6) to (7) provides additional evidence for the above discussion, which examine how 
lineage-based heterogeneity affected the change of share from 1998 to 2002.  As shown in column 
(7), the increase in the share of the village budget that was spent on public goods is larger in Type 
1 villages than Type 3 villages by 3.1 percentage points.  As China continues to make progress in 
switching to a democratic electoral process, median voters play increasingly more important roles 
in village affairs.  Thus, over time, their opinions are better accepted when the village committees 
make decisions about how much to spend on public goods.  Formal institution performs better with 
the help of lineage culture.  Thus accordingly, in 2002, we observe there was a greater increase in 
the share of the village budget spent on public goods in the more homogeneous villages.   
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5.3 Comparison between the South and North 
In this section, we split the entire sample into two subsamples – the South and the North, to re-
examine the association between lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural 
China.  In Table 6, the odd columns report the regression results for all of the cooperation variables 
using the sample in the South while the even columns use the sample in the North.  Notice here 
the South (North) represents provinces with relatively stronger (weaker) lineage culture.   
In Table 6, column (1) and (3) imply mutual help, either monetary or non-monetary, happens 
more frequently in Type 1 villages or Type 2 villages than in Type 3 villages in the South.  By 
contrast in column (2) and (4), there is no evidence that lineage-based heterogeneity has an impact 
on mutual help in the North.  Columns (5) to (10) show the results for cross-lineage mutual help.  
Column (5) reports that in the South, Type 1 and Type 2 villages completed more required unpaid 
labor days than Type 3 villages did by respectively, 15.2 and 10.7 percentage points.  Column (7) 
shows that Type 1 and Type 2 villages spend a greater share of the village budget on public goods 
provision than Type 3 villages do by, respectively, 3.4 and 2.5 percentage points. The coefficient 
of TYPE1 is marginally significant while the coefficient of TYPE2 is not.  Column (9) shows that 
when we restrict the sample to the South, the share of public goods spending increases more in 
Type 1 and Type 2 villages than in Type 3 villages by, respectively, 4.2 and 4 percentage points.  
In columns (6), (8) and (10), the coefficients are no longer significant when we restrict the sample 
to the North.    
   Our results show that overall in the South, the association between lineage-based 
homogeneity and intra/cross-lineage behavior is positive and significant.  In the North, however, 
the significance goes away. This provides additional evidence to the causal impact of lineage-
based heterogeneity on cooperation.22 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
The discussion so far indicates that within-lineage reciprocity, whether monetary or non-monetary, 
is more likely to occur in homogeneous villages than in heterogeneous villages.  However this 
                                                          
22 Note that in a Type 1 village, two random villagers are more likely to be in the same lineage.  So there may be a 
concern that even if there is no causal relation between heterogeneity and intra-lineage cooperation, individuals are 
still more likely to be helping their lineage members.  Our results from the South and the North exclude this possibility.  
We would not observe the differences in cooperative behavior between the South and the North, because if the above 
concern was true Type 1 villagers in the North would be helping their lineage members more frequently as well. 
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result may arise because of unobserved variables. So in this section, we conduct alternative tests 
to address this problem. 
 
5.4.1 Job Characteristics 
From the early 1970s, a large number of rural workers in China started to look for a job in urban 
areas. This does not affect our identification strategy since the Chinese government has a strict 
migration policy whereby migrants in China do not have access to institutional assistance from 
local governments.  However, one may be concerned that due to the rapid industrial development 
in the southern part of China, stronger lineage networks make it easier for rural migrants to find a 
job in the urban area, because of which rural migrants may need more help from their lineage 
members, especially to take care of their family.  To address this concern, we control for the 
respondents’ job categories and working locations.23 These results are reported in Table 7.   
      In all specifications in Table 7, we include individual controls, village controls and province 
fixed effects as in the baseline models. Column (1), (4) and (7) include job category dummies only; 
column (2), (5) and (8) include working location dummies only; column (3), (6) and (9) include 
both. Using sample data from the South, our results indicate that the coefficients on type variables 
are consistent in all specification with and without job characteristic controls. 
 
5.4.2 Village Leader Quality 
Another concern maybe an omitted variable capturing the quality of village leaders.  In imperial 
China, a village was actually a lineage system. Lineage heads were responsible both for 
administration and public affairs.  After 1949, lineage systems were reorganized into an 
administrative village and lineage heads were no longer in charge of village affairs.  However, if 
strong lineages are correlated with good qualities such as leadership or intelligence, then those 
qualities may at the same time affect village affairs such as public good provision.  To address this 
concern, we include village head and the party secretary characteristics into our baseline model 
and check how the results are affected.  Those characteristics include age, education, management 
experience, non-agriculture experience and years in office. These results are reported in Table 8. 
                                                          
23 Job category includes agriculture, forestry, miners, industry, construction, transportation, commerce, restaurants, 
marketing, real estate, public service, personal service, health, education, scientific research, finance, government 
and others.  Working location includes (1) within village; ( 2) out of village, within township; (3) out of township, 
within county;  (4) out of county, within province; (5) out of province   
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        In all specifications we include village controls and province fixed effects as in the baseline 
models in addition to leaders’ quality controls.  Column (1) includes individual controls since this 
specification is individual level. Using sample data from the South, the results show that the 
coefficients on type variables are similar to the results in the odd columns of Table 6.   
 
 5.4.3 Membership in the Largest Lineage in a Homogeneous Village 
An individual’s lineage is much like an organization to which he or she belongs in that the 
members tend to know each other quite well, and have information about each other’s social and 
economic activities. The importance of lineage organizations increases in the presence of 
asymmetric information or other market imperfections.  Accordingly, such an organization can 
enforce/facilitate informal transactions because it directs both punishment and reciprocity at not 
only the individual, but also at the members of his/her group (La Ferrara, 2003).  Moreover, the 
enforcement may be stronger as the size of the lineage increases (Pan, 2012).24  In a large lineage 
where everyone knows everyone else, due to clustering over generations, a deviant may be denied 
future exchanges not only with the person in ready to exchange or requiring assistance, but also 
with other lineage members.  In other words, the cost of defection potentially rises as the size of 
the lineage increases.  Consequently, reciprocity will occur more often in large lineages than in 
small lineages.  Not surprisingly, note that the size of a lineage in a homogeneous village, on 
average, is greater than a lineage in a heterogeneous village.  This explains why there is more 
frequent reciprocity in homogenous villages than in heterogeneous villages.   
        To further test this hypothesis, we use the following model to investigate whether the 
cooperative behavior is more frequent in the largest local lineage than in the other smaller lineages 
in the same village: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽23𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛾 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                     (7) 
where 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 again are the latent variables for help or borrow for individual i in village j.  
𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗 is a binary variable that is 1 if the individual i  belongs to the largest lineage in village 
j.  𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the same vector of individual characteristics as in model (1).  𝛼𝑗 is a vector of village fixed 
effects.  The variable of interest for this model is 𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑗.  We expect that 𝛽23 > 0, which 
measure the average treatment effect of belonging to the largest lineage on mutual reciprocity.  We 
                                                          
24 According to Posner's (1980) study of institutions in primitive societies, the reciprocity among lineage members 
can be regarded as a form of implicit contract that says, “I help you today because I expect you to help me tomorrow.”   
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restrict our sample to Type 1 villages because the size difference between the largest lineage and 
other lineages is the greatest in Type 1 villages.  
The results are presented in Table 9.  Columns 1 to 3 report the coefficients for borrow while 
columns 4 to 6 report ordered probit coefficients for help.  We use the entire sample in columns 1 
and 4.  Columns 2 and 5 restrict the sample to the respondents from the South of China, while 
columns 3 and 5 restrict the sample to those from the North of China.  Columns 1 and 4 
demonstrate that belonging to the largest lineage has a positive and significant effect on both 
monetary and non-monetary help.  When we use the regional subsamples, the coefficient of 
SURNAME is statistically insignificant for monetary help (columns 2 and 3).  However, for non-
monetary help, bearing the largest surname has a positive effect in the South, while it has no effect 
in the North (columns 5 and 6).  These results provide evidence that within-lineage reciprocity 
increases with the size of the lineage.   
Taken together, these results can serve as additional evidence that the relationship between 
lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior is not driven by unobserved omitted 
variables. 
 
5.5 Other Economic Outcomes25 
We have shown that lineage-based heterogeneity is negatively associated with both intra- and 
cross-lineage cooperative behavior.  It is then conceivable that when people cooperate with each 
other, over time this greater cooperation can have an impact on other types of economic outcomes. 
To make our analysis stronger, in this section we further explore how lineage-based heterogeneity 
affects other economic outcomes in rural villages. Specifically, we examine its impact on villagers’ 
financial assets and income, outflow of rural migrant workers and village education.   Table 10 
reports the results of this analysis.  Again, model (1) is used for individual level analysis while 
model (2) is used for village level analysis. 
      The outcome variable in column (1) is assets, which measures the logarithm of the 
respondent’s total financial assets at the end of 2002.  The results show that belonging to the Type 
1 village increases the amount of financial assets by 14.1 percentage points while belonging to the 
Type 2 village increases the amount of financial assets by 14.5 percentage points.  The estimates 
are both significant at 1 percent level.  The outcome variable in column (2) is income, measuring 
                                                          
25 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the idea for the analysis presented in this section. 
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the logarithm of the respondent’s income from farming, fishing and forestry.  Most villagers in 
rural China follow these occupations and need intensive cooperation.  The results in column (2) 
also suggest that lineage-based homogeneity has a positive impact on villagers’ income. Both of 
the estimates are significant at 1 percent level.   
        Column (3) reports how lineage-based heterogeneity affect the percentage of rural-urban 
migrants in their home villages.  Rural to urban migrants are registered in rural areas but working 
and living in the cities for at least 180 days per year (Zhong and Zhao, 2013).  Since the Chinese 
government has a strict migration policy whereby rural to urban migrants in China do not have 
access to institutional assistance from local governments, these workers usually have to rely on 
connections from their villages to look for a job in the cities.  Therefore we expect lineage-based 
homogeneity should have a positive impact on rural-urban migration.  Thus columns (3) uses 
migrants as the outcome variable which measures the percentage of rural to urban migrants in a 
village.  The results show that belonging to the most homogeneous village, or a Type 1 village, 
increases the migration rate by 2.38 percentage points.  Belonging to a Type 2 village, increases 
the migration rate by 1.83 percentage points.  Both estimates are significant at 5 percent level.   
        Since China enacted the nine-year compulsory education in 1986, almost every village in 
China has a primary school. So column (4) investigates the existence of a junior high school in a 
village instead, and tests whether there is a relationship between lineage-based heterogeneity and 
the availability of educational resources which can be viewed as a local public good.  We use 
school as the outcome variable.  It is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a junior high school 
is located in the village.  The marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means are reported in 
column (4).  The results show that a Type 1 village is 11.7 percent more likely to have a junior 
high school than a Type 3 village while a Type 2 village is 9.49 percent more likely to have a 
junior high school than a Type 3 village.  Generally, the above results suggest that the lineage 
culture not only fosters cooperation, but also improves economic outcomes. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper studies the relationship between lineage-based heterogeneity and the nature of 
cooperative behavior in Chinese villages.  Rural China provides an excellent environment for this 
study because China’s central government arbitrarily grouped adjacent lineages into administrative 
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villages during the communist movement.  As a result, some villages are composed of one, or a 
few large lineages, while others are composed of a number of small lineages.  The exogenously-
determined lineage structure within a village presents a pseudo-experiment in lineage-based 
heterogeneity.   
        Using data from the 2002 CHIPS survey, we define three types of villages: Types 1 through 
3, which range from most homogenous (Type 1) to most heterogeneous (Type 3).  We find that 
people in Types 1 or 2 villages are more likely than those in Type 3 to have both intra-lineage and 
cross-lineage cooperation.  In terms of intra-lineage cooperation, we find that monetary and non-
monetary reciprocity among lineage members are more likely to occur in Types 1 and 2 villages 
than in Type 3 villages.  With regard to cross-lineage cooperation, villagers from Types 1 and 2 
villages are found to fulfill higher percentage of the requirement of free labor than those from Type 
3 villages.  We also find that Types 1 and 2 villages spend a greater share of the village budget on 
public goods relative to Type 3 villages, and the share of public goods in the village budget also 
grew faster in Type 1 villages compared to Type 3 villages during 1998 to 2002.   
    This paper adds to the existing empirical literature on the relationship between cooperation 
and diversity by simultaneously examining intra-group and cross-group cooperative behavior.  We 
first study physical and monetary cooperation among villagers.  In our analysis, we provide a 
channel through which heterogeneity affects the provision of public goods, because lineage-based 
heterogeneity and the share of the village budget spent on public goods are both measured at a 
micro-geographic level, i.e., the village level.  All these taken together provide evidence that 
lineage structure can also be viewed through Fukayama’s (2011) tribalism lens, adding to our 
growing understanding of what constitutes the glue that holds societies together. A future direction 
for this research is to understand how income distribution between lineages affect mutual help and 
public good provision.   
Although, we use two different dependent variables to study intra-lineage and cross-lineage 
cooperation, we have a single source of variation in the independent variable – the degree of 
homogeneity in the village. Since we are using relatives and neighbors to approximate lineage 
members, there may still be some concerns about the difference between intra-group and cross-
group cooperative behavior.  A follow-up study that uses more specific questions to gather data 
about lineage members and distinguishes them from non-lineage members could reinforce our 
findings. Nevertheless, our study provides significant evidence that the lineage system continues 
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to play an important role in the growth and development of rural China.  Informal norms associated 
with lineage affiliation guide villagers’ behavior, and can actually serve as a good substitute for 
some types of formal institutions in rural China.  It is not a rare phenomenon that lineage authorities 
help mediate disputes involving violence between lineage members.  This is sometimes even more 
effective than formal policing and enforcement.  Thus, our findings suggest that policy-makers can 
utilize the power of large lineages to promote the provision of public goods and enhance the 
effectiveness of rural development. Indeed, we find that Type 1 villages do better not only in terms 
of financial assets and income but are also more likely to have a junior high school in the village. 
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Figure 1. The Surveyed Provinces in China 
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Figure 2. Three Types of Villages by Lineage Structures 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
 Definition 
 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Obs, 
All South North  
Dependent Variable     
  Borrow =0 if none/few or sometimes; =1 if often or 
very often 
0.383 
(0.486) 
0.387 
(0.487) 
0.379 
(0.486) 
9180 
Help =0, 1, 2, or 3.  The smallest value of help 
is 0, which means the respondent answers 
“non/few” or “sometimes” to all three 
categories (help farming, help house 
building and help taking care of others); 
the largest value of help is 3, which means 
the respondent answers “often” or “very 
often” to all the three categories 
1.645 
(1.026) 
1.575 
(1.037) 
1.731 
(1.007) 
9180 
Fulfill =1 if the respondent physically fulfills the 
assigned collective working requirement 
without paying any penalty;  
=(actually completed unpaid working 
days/ required unpaid working days) if 
not 
0.891 
(0.285) 
0.881 
(0.298) 
0.903 
(0.268) 
9180 
Share the share of the village budget spent on 
education, medical system, and other  
public goods 
0.149 
(1.767) 
0.141 
(0.170) 
0.157 
(0.183) 
779 
Sgrowth change of share from 1998 to 2002 -0.005 
(0.166) 
-0.006 
(0.154) 
-0.003 
(0.176) 
769 
Independent Variable (Village Characteristics)     
TYPE1 =1 if one largest lineage dominates in the 
village; =0 if not 
0.299 
(0.458) 
0.302 
(0.460) 
0.295 
(0.457) 
961 
TYPE2 =1 if five largest lineages dominate in the 
village; =0 if not 
0.368 
(0.483) 
0.398 
(0.490) 
0.335 
(0.472) 
961 
MOUNTAIN =1 if in mountainous area; =0 if in hilly or 
plain area 
0.505 
(0.500) 
0.650 
(0.478) 
0.341 
(0.474) 
959 
SUBURB =1 if the suburb of a city/middle of city; =0 
if not 
0.080 
(0.272) 
0.051 
(0.220) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
961 
DISTANCE TO 
TRANSPORTATION 
Distance from the closest transportation 
terminals in kilometers 
5.449 
(8.236) 
5.062 
(7,674) 
5.883 
(8.811) 
938 
DISTANCE TO 
COUNTY 
Distance from the nearest county in 
kilometers 
24.128 
(21.054) 
26.519 
(22.166) 
21.699 
(19.442) 
955 
POVERTY =1 if the village is in a county designated 
as a province or national level poverty 
county or in a town designated as a 
province level poverty town; 
 =0 if not 
0.317 
(0.466) 
0.363 
(0.481) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
961 
POPTOTAL Population of the village in 2002 1811.825 
(1185.602) 
1928.862 
(1307.258) 
1691.578 
(1033.645) 
961 
VINCOME 2002 net income per capita (in yuan) of the 
village 
2453.4 
(1497.472) 
2860.242 
(1711.333) 
2035.351 
(1094.09) 
951 
PLANTAREA 2002 total planting area (in mu) for the 
village 
3553.328 
(2928.316) 
3011.117 
(2503.255) 
4109.295 
(3216.957) 
953 
CANAL98 =1 if using canal as a major irrigating 
method in 1998; =0 if using well 
0.692 
(0.462) 
0.901 
(0.299) 
0.442 
(0.497) 
908 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
 Definition All South North Obs. 
Independent Variable (Village Head Characteristics)        
YEARS IN OFFICE = number of years the village head has been in 
office 
5.197 
(0.499) 
5.315 
(5.112) 
5.061 
(4.827) 
960 
AGE =1 if the age of the village head is 29 or less;  
=2 if the village head is 30-34; =3 if village head is 
35-39;  
=4 if village head is 40-44; =5 if village head is 45-
49;  
=6 if village head is 50-54; =7 if village head is 55 
or above 
4.518 
(1.449) 
4.456 
(1.476) 
4.589 
(1.416) 
960 
EDUCATION =1 if the educational level of the village head is 
primary school or less;  
=2 if junior middle school; =3 if senior middle 
school;  
=4 if technical secondary school; = 5 if college or 
above 
2.463 
(0.914) 
2.450 
(0.869) 
2.478 
(0.962) 
960 
MANAGEMENT 
EXPERIENCE 
=1 if the village head has enterprise management 
experience of ; 
=0 if otherwise 
0.381 
(0.486) 
0.365 
(0.482) 
0.399 
(0.490) 
960 
NON-AGRI BUSINESS 
EXPERIENCE 
=1 if the village head has operating nonagricultural 
family business experience ; =0 if otherwise 
0.409 
(0.492) 
0.405 
(0.491) 
0.413 
(0.492) 
960 
Independent Variable (Party Secretary Characteristics)        
YEARS IN OFFICE = the number of years the party secretary has been 
in office 
7.123 
(6.787) 
6.950 
(6.287) 
7.320 
(7.312) 
960 
AGE =1 if the age of the party secretary is 29 or less;  
=2 if party secretary is 30-34; =3 if party secretary 
is 35-39;  
=4 if party secretary is 40-44; =5 if party secretary 
is 45-49;  
=6 if party secretary is 50-54;=7 if party secretary 
is 55 or above 
4.860 
(1.409) 
4.767 
(1.441) 
4.965 
(1.366) 
960 
EDUCATION =1 if the educational level of the party secretary is 
primary school or less;  
=2 if junior middle school; =3 if senior middle 
school;  
=4 if technical secondary school; = 5 if college or 
above 
2.583 
(1.004) 
2.547 
(0.939) 
2.623 
(1.073) 
960 
MANAGEMENT 
EXPERIENCE 
=1 if the party secretary has enterprise 
management experience ; 
=0 if otherwise 
0.387 
(0.487) 
0.372 
(0.484) 
0.404 
(0.491) 
960 
NON-AGRI BUSINESS 
EXPERIENCE 
=1 if the party secretary has operating 
nonagricultural family business 
experience; =0 if otherwise 
0.459 
(0.496) 
0.467 
(0.499) 
0.450 
(0.498) 
960 
      
 (Continued on next page) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
 Definition All South North Obs. 
Independent Variable (Personal Characteristics)        
FEMALE =1 if female; =0 if male 0.255 
(0.436) 
0.230 
(0.421) 
0.285 
(0.452) 
8032 
AGE Age of the respondent 45.354 
(10.692) 
45.552 
(10.806) 
45.109 
(10.544) 
8032 
MARRIAGE =1 if the respondent is married; =0 otherwise 0.951 
(0.215) 
0.945 
(0.227) 
0.958 
(0.200) 
8032 
CADREA =1 if the respondent is a cadre; =0 if not 0.160 
(0.366) 
0.166 
(0.372) 
0.152 
(0.359) 
8032 
EDUCATIONB The respondent’s years of schooling 7.010 
(2.716) 
6.787 
(2.738) 
7.287 
(2.661) 
8032 
HHINCOME Total net household income (in yuan) in 2002  10704.25 
(8594.038) 
12308.3 
(10037.08) 
8903.212 
(6128.024) 
8027 
HHSIZE Total number of residents living in household for 
6 months or more 
4.100 
(1.306) 
4.143 
(1.296) 
4.025 
(1.314) 
8032 
SURNAME =1 if respondent belongs to the largest lineage; 
=0 if not 
0.412 
(0.492) 
0.406 
(0.491) 
0.420 
(0.493) 
8029 
PAST 
DISASTER 
Number of natural disasters suffered in the past 
five years (1998-2002)=1 if none; =2 if one; =3 
if two; =4 if three or more 
1.990 
(1.108) 
1.798 
(1.010) 
2.228 
(1.176) 
7980 
Note:  
a. In 2002, 1 USD= 8.2770 Yuan , according to China Statistical Yearbook 2011 
b. “Cadre” means administrators in China.  In both Russia’s and China’s revolutionary eras, this word refers to a group 
of leaders active in promoting the revolution of the communist party.  It no longer has any revolutionary implications 
in today’s China. 
c. If there is a missing value, we replace it with a value estimated from education level. For example, if the education 
level is college or above, years of schooling = 17; if the education level is professional school, years of schooling = 
14; if the education level is middle level professional, technical or vocational school, years of schooling  = 12; if the 
education level is senior middle school, years of schooling = 12; if the education level is junior middle school, years 
of schooling = 9; if the education level is 4 or more years of elementary school, years of schooling = 5; if the education 
level is 1-3 years of elementary school, years of schooling = 2; if the education level is illiterate or semi-illiterate, 
years of schooling = 0. 
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                               Table 2: Share of Each Village Type for Each Province 
Provinces Number of Villages 
Village Types 
Type1 Type2 Type3 
Northern Provinces    
Beijing 16 0.375 0.313 0.313 
Hebei 37 0.622 0.324 0.0541 
Shaanxi 37 0.514 0.405 0.0811 
Shanxi 40 0.350 0.500 0.150 
Gansu 32 0.313 0.375 0.313 
Shandong 63 0.587 0.317 0.0952 
Henan 53 0.283 0.679 0.0377 
Xinjiang 80 0.0500 0.0375 0.912 
Liaoning 45 0.0889 0.444 0.467 
Jilin 48 0.0208 0.167 0.813 
Southern Provinces    
Jiangsu 44 0.0682 0.386 0.545 
Zhejiang 53 0.566 0.189 0.245 
Anhui 44 0.295 0.386 0.318 
Jiangxi 43 0.302 0.535 0.163 
Chongqing 20 0.0500 0.300 0.650 
Sichuan 50 0.260 0.360 0.380 
Hubei 52 0.288 0.481 0.231 
Hunan 45 0.267 0.467 0.267 
Guangdong 53 0.509 0.321 0.170 
Yunnan 26 0.154 0.308 0.538 
Guangxi 40 0.275 0.525 0.200 
Guizhou 40 0.300 0.500 0.200 
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Table 3: Selection on Obervables 
Dependent Variables: individual characteristics and village characteristics 
 
 Independent variables 
Dep. Var. Type1 
 
Type2 
 
T1_S 
 
T2_S 
 
Obs 
 
Individual Characteristics 
 
AGE  1.681** [0.714] 1.131* [0.623] 0.027 [1.001] -0.514 [0.869] 6,840 
MARRIAGE  -0.001 [0.011] -0.015 [0.011] -0.008 [0.016] -0.004 [0.016] 6,840 
CADRE  0.016 [0.029] 0.009 [0.023] 0.014 [0.037] 0.012 [0.033] 6,816 
EDUCATION  0.172 [0.189] -0.148 [0.177] -0.077 [0.241] 0.064 [0.219] 6,840 
HHINCOME  0.04 [0.050] -0.027 [0.058] -0.074 [0.083] 0.001 [0.076] 6,836 
HHSIZE  0.13 [0.099] -0.003 [0.087] -0.045 [0.136] 0.017 [0.114] 6,840 
SURNAME  0.406*** [0.049] 0.079* [0.044] 0.145** [0.060] 0.139*** [0.052] 6,839 
PAST DISASTER -0.026 [0.156] 0.099 [0.129] 0.126 [0.190] 0.086 [0.165] 6,774 
 
Village Characteristics 
 
SUBURB   -0.034 [0.026] -0.019 [0.027] -0.013 [0.047] -0.008 [0.040] 733 
MOUNTAIN  -0.056 [0.076] 0.039 [0.067] -0.041 [0.106] 0.005 [0.086] 733 
DISTANCE TO 
TRANSPORTATION 
-0.188 [1.480] 2.551* [1.535] -0.216 [1.642] -2.559 [1.698] 718 
DISTANCE TO 
COUNTY  
-4.075 [4.404] -1.821 [3.748] 6.217 [5.328] 2.138 [4.974] 729 
POVERTY  -0.036 [0.088] 0.064 [0.074] 0.174 [0.123] 0.054 [0.104] 733 
POPTOTAL  -0.121 [0.122] -0.1 [0.089] -0.07 [0.162] 0.098 [0.115] 733 
VINCOME  -0.067 [0.068] -0.132** [0.066] -0.016 [0.103] 0.116 [0.090] 727 
PLANTAREA  -0.188 [0.151] 0.053 [0.105] 0.14 [0.223] 0.048 [0.176] 729 
CANAL98  -0.09 [0.058] -0.067 [0.069] 0.014 [0.080] 0.086 [0.076] 694 
PENALTY  3.484 [2.766] 1.795 [2.368] -4.276 [3.030] -0.524 [2.713] 153 
      Village leaders(the party secretary) 
YEARS IN OFFICE 0.921 [1.030] -0.806 [0.806] -2.204 [1.376] 1.406 [1.247] 733 
AGE 0.115 [0.223] 0.001 [0.219] -0.187 [0.306] 0.231 [0.288] 733 
EDUCATION -0.213 [0.213] -0.147 [0.158] 0.029 [0.246] 0.119 [0.201] 733 
MANAGEMENT 
EXPERIENCE 
-0.013 [0.093] 0.072 [0.089] -0.139 [0.108] -0.168 [0.108] 733 
NON-AGRI  
BUSINESS 
EXPERIENCE 
0.002 [0.094] -0.025 [0.079] -0.148 [0.118] -0.051 [0.101] 733 
      Village leaders(village head) 
YEARS IN OFFICE -0.294 [0.644] -0.852 [0.600] -0.179 [0.948] 0.331 [0.917] 726 
AGE 0.711*** [0.264] 0.336 [0.207] -0.822** [0.346] -0.519* [0.285] 729 
EDUCATION -0.305* [0.160] -0.357** [0.147] 0.1 [0.193] 0.236 [0.184] 729 
MANAGEMENT 
EXPERIENCE 
-0.084 [0.071] -0.074 [0.071] -0.035 [0.092] -0.037 [0.093] 729 
NON-AGRI  
BUSINESS 
EXPERIENCE 
-0.029 [0.085] -0.098 [0.068] -0.016 [0.112] 0.143 [0.095] 729 
Note:  *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Clustering of the residuals is at the county level. 
All specifications include province dummies 
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Table 4: Lineage-based Heterogeneity and Intra-lineage Cooperative Behavior 
Dependent Variables: borrow and help 
  borrow    help  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
TYPE1 0.0715** 0.0722** 0.0909***  0.139** 0.152** 0.175** 
 (0.0284) (0.0292) (0.0309)  (0.0688) (0.0691) (0.0745) 
TYPE2 0.0645** 0.0597** 0.0653**  0.134** 0.131** 0.115* 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0283)  (0.0621) (0.0618) (0.0664) 
AGE  0.0111*** 0.0106***   0.0140* 0.0129 
  (0.00386) (0.00404)   (0.00783) (0.00807) 
AGE2  -0.000155*** -0.000151***   -0.000238*** -0.000216** 
  (4.08e-05) (4.24e-05)   (8.55e-05) (8.74e-05) 
FEMALE  -0.0395** -0.0337**   -0.0484 -0.0193 
  (0.0155) (0.0164)   (0.0370) (0.0364) 
MARRIAGE  -0.0338 -0.0450   -0.0787 -0.0942 
  (0.0288) (0.0298)   (0.0600) (0.0607) 
CADRE  0.0360** 0.0348**   -0.00287 0.00197 
  (0.0153) (0.0159)   (0.0417) (0.0363) 
EDUCATION  -0.00456* -0.00499*   -0.0130** -0.00988* 
  (0.00248) (0.00262)   (0.00554) (0.00588) 
HHINCOME   -0.0362*** -0.0141   -0.0610** -0.0103 
  (0.0118) (0.0120)   (0.0257) (0.0262) 
HHSIZE  0.0322*** 0.0271***   0.0388*** 0.0240** 
  (0.00522) (0.00544)   (0.0117) (0.0120) 
SURNAME  -0.00753 -0.0160   -0.0305 -0.0449 
  (0.0173) (0.0179)   (0.0380) (0.0395) 
PAST DISASTER  0.0153* 0.0122   0.0116 -0.0103 
  (0.00859) (0.00924)   (0.0200) (0.0215) 
SUBURB   0.0291    -0.00597 
   (0.0472)    (0.0993) 
MOUNTAIN   0.0203    0.0861 
   (0.0256)    (0.0627) 
DISTANCE    0.000154    0.00152 
TO COUNTY   (0.000602)    (0.00159) 
POVERTY    0.0222    -0.0405 
   (0.0272)    (0.0659) 
POPTOTAL    0.0367*    0.00420 
   (0.0211)    (0.0499) 
VINCOME    0.573    0.842 
   (0.434)    (0.975) 
VINCOME2    -0.0414    -0.0684 
   (0.0281)    (0.0635) 
PLANTAREA    -0.0106    0.000555 
   (0.0155)    (0.0344) 
CANAL98    0.0117    0.0829 
   (0.0283)    (0.0675) 
        
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,032 7,941 7,367  8,032 7,941 7,367 
R-squared 0.021 0.036 0.045  0.053 0.065 0.068 
Note:  *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on OLS estimates.  Clustering of the 
residuals is at the village level.  All specifications are individual analysis. 
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Table 5: Lineage-based Heterogeneity and Cross-lineage Cooperative Behavior 
Dependent Variables: fufill, share and sgrowth 
  fufill   share  sgrowth 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
          
TYPE1 0.0958* 0.0762 0.0894  0.0322** 0.0394**  0.0343** 0.0312* 
 (0.0561) (0.0554) (0.0572)  (0.0143) (0.0162)  (0.0153) (0.0182) 
TYPE2 0.0877* 0.0793* 0.0696  0.0219 0.0333*  0.0195 0.0228 
 (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0465)  (0.0169) (0.0179)  (0.0153) (0.0165) 
AGE  0.00408 -0.000610       
  (0.0127) (0.0123)       
AGE2  -5.46e-05 -5.92e-08       
  (0.000157) (0.000149)       
FEMALE  -0.00446 -0.00206       
  (0.0289) (0.0291)       
MARRIAGE  -0.00591 0.0170       
  (0.0522) (0.0544)       
CADRE  0.0101 -0.00634       
  (0.0296) (0.0270)       
EDUCATION  -0.000249 0.00210       
  (0.00461) (0.00491)       
HHINCOME   -0.0439* -0.0351       
  (0.0230) (0.0242)       
HHSIZE  0.0101 0.000568       
  (0.0114) (0.0123)       
SURNAME  0.0651** 0.0427       
  (0.0326) (0.0365)       
PAST DISASTER  0.0302* 0.00483       
  (0.0170) (0.0187)       
          
Village controls No No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,424 1,406 1,282  760 695  737 680 
R-squared 0.303 0.320 0.346  0.124 0.152  0.034 0.048 
 *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on OLS 
 estimates.  Column (1) to (3) are individual level analysis and residuals are clustered at the village level. 
The others are village level analysis and residuals clustered at the county level.   
  
45 
 
Table 6: Lineage-based Heterogeneity and Cooperative Behavior: South-North Comparison 
 Borrow  Help  Fufill  Share  Sgrowth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 South North  South North  South North  South North  South North 
               
TYPE1  0.125*** 0.0491  0.217** 0.0728  0.152** -0.0744  0.0344* 0.0441  0.0420* 0.0160 
 (0.0383) (0.0539)  (0.0984) (0.111)  (0.0695) (0.0914)  (0.0194) (0.0292)  (0.0249) (0.0275) 
TYPE2  0.0837** 0.0519  0.188** -0.0316  0.107* -0.126*  0.0251 0.0357  0.0395* -0.00212 
 (0.0341) (0.0499)  (0.0851) (0.103)  (0.0601) (0.0679)  (0.0184) (0.0334)  (0.0198) (0.0274) 
               
Individual Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No No  No No 
Village controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4,242 3,125  4,242 3,125  811 471  387 308  382 298 
R-squared 0.059 0.049  0.083 0.055  0.385 0.390  0.215 0.120  0.068 0.077 
 Note: *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on OLS estimates. 
 Column (1) to (6) are individual level analysis and residuals are clustered at the village level. The others are village  
level analysis and residuals are clustered at the county level.   
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Table 7: Robustness Check: Job Characteristics 
  Borrow     Help    Fulfill   
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
            
TYPE1 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.128***  0.214** 0.218** 0.217**  0.161** 0.156** 0.164** 
 (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0386)  (0.0981) (0.0977) (0.0976)  (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0695) 
TYPE2 0.0832** 0.0855** 0.0851**  0.184** 0.190** 0.186**  0.114* 0.111* 0.118* 
 (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0341)  (0.0850) (0.0848) (0.0847)  (0.0600) (0.0606) (0.0605) 
            
Job Category Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Working Location No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
            
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,242 4,242 4,242  4,242 4,242 4,242  811 811 811 
R-squared 0.061 0.060 0.062  0.087 0.086 0.089  0.399 0.390 0.402 
Note: *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on OLS estimates. 
  Clustering of the residuals is at the village level.  All specifications are individual analysis. 
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Table 8:  Robustness Check: Village Leaders’ Quality 
 Fulfill Share Sgrowth  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
TYPE1 0.165** 0.0369* 0.0454* 
 (0.0699) (0.0194) (0.0256) 
TYPE2 0.131** 0.0255 0.0403* 
 (0.0625) (0.0177) (0.0205) 
    
Leaders' Quality Yes Yes Yes 
    
Individual Controls Yes No No 
Village controls Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 811 383 378 
R-squared 0.433 0.240 0.088 
  Note: *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes 
 p<0.1. Coefficients are based on OLS estimates. 
   Column (1) is an individual analysis and residuals are clustered at  
the village level. The others are village level analysis and residuals 
are clustered at the county level. 
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Table 9: Intra-lineage Cooperation in Type 1 Villages 
Dependent Variable: Borrow and Help 
  
Borrow  Help  
(1)All (2)South (3)North  (4)All (5)South (6)North 
SURNAME  0.286* 0.248 0.24  0.360** 0.660*** 0.118  
[0.167] [0.244] [0.235]  [0.169] [0.225] [0.265] 
AGE  0.045 0.004 0.123**  0.06 0.072 0.099  
[0.039] [0.054] [0.057]  [0.047] [0.077] [0.063] 
MARRIAGE  0.1 0.956** -1.062**  -0.256 0.547 -1.263**  
[0.327] [0.426] [0.524]  [0.333] [0.385] [0.580] 
CADRE   -0.097 -0.430* 0.365  0.288 -0.008 0.656**  
[0.173] [0.232] [0.317]  [0.184] [0.239] [0.282] 
EDUCATION  0.000 0.009 -0.021  -0.04 -0.009 -0.065  
[0.029] [0.039] [0.047]  [0.027] [0.034] [0.044] 
HHINCOME  0.07 0.211 -0.212  -0.007 0.068 -0.082  
[0.134] [0.183] [0.214]  [0.144] [0.216] [0.176] 
HHSIZE  0.082* 0.137** 0.063  0.038 -0.021 0.091  
[0.049] [0.066] [0.080]  [0.048] [0.070] [0.069] 
PAST DISASTER 0.03 0.072 -0.066  -0.023 -0.098 0.011  
[0.107] [0.136] [0.178]  [0.093] [0.114] [0.157] 
        
Village FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of villages 277 168 109  262 159 103 
Observations 904 542 362  993 604 389 
Note: 
*** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Coefficients are based on probit estimates 
(borrow) and ordered probit estimates (help).  Clustering of the residuals is at the village level.  All 
specifications are individual level analysis and include village dummies.   
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Table 10: Lineage-based Heterogeneity and Other Economic Outcomes 
Dependent Variables: Assets, Income, Migrant and Education 
 Individual level Village level 
 Assets Income Migrants School 
 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) Probit 
TYPE1 0.141*** 0.0694*** 0.0238** 0.117** 
 (0.0303) (0.0176) (0.00984) (0.0531) 
TYPE2 0.145*** 0.0983*** 0.0183** 0.0949** 
 (0.0261) (0.0149) (0.00783) (0.0420) 
AGE -0.00693* 0.0210***   
 (0.00359) (0.00192)   
AGE2 8.23e-05* -0.000229***   
 (4.22e-05) (2.27e-05)   
FEMALE 0.0267 -0.0297**   
 (0.0216) (0.0125)   
MARRIAGE 0.0706* -0.137***   
 (0.0367) (0.0194)   
CADRE -0.187*** 0.0623***   
 (0.0414) (0.0218)   
EDUCATION 0.0129*** 0.00193   
 (0.00390) (0.00225)   
HHSIZE 0.0541*** 0.110***   
 (0.00850) (0.00463)   
SURNAME 0.0379* -0.00869   
 (0.0227) (0.0127)   
PAST DISASTER -0.0606*** 0.0174***   
 (0.0110) (0.00534)   
SUBURB -0.287*** -0.279*** -0.00608 -0.000391 
 (0.0534) (0.0361) (0.0143) (0.0616) 
MOUNTAIN -0.420*** -0.138*** 0.0340*** -0.0450 
 (0.0263) (0.0177) (0.0117) (0.0401) 
DISTANCE  -0.000219 0.000337 9.97e-05 -7.39e-05 
TO COUNTY (0.000539) (0.000244) (0.000186) (0.000696) 
POVERTY  -0.851*** -0.152*** -0.00433 0.0510 
 (0.0262) (0.0132) (0.0115) (0.0359) 
POPTOTAL  -0.105*** -0.242*** 0.00900 0.188*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0189) (0.0101) (0.0373) 
VINCOME  -8.883*** 0.385 -0.0411*** -0.0491 
 (0.444) (0.313) (0.0134) (0.0423) 
PLANTAREA  0.00559 0.240*** 0.00435 -0.0663*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0157) (0.00518) (0.0162) 
CANAL98  0.246*** 0.124*** 0.0185 0.0381 
 (0.0400) (0.0203) (0.0151) (0.0404) 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 17,436 18,932 469 422 
R-squared 0.337 0.225 0.263 0.288 
Note: *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. Column (1) to (2) are individual level 
analysis and residuals are clustered at the village level. The others are village level analysis and residuals are 
clustered at the county level.  Coefficients from column (1) to (3) are based on OLS estimates. Coefficients 
in column (4) are marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means.  Assets measures the total amount of  
financial assets of the respondents.  Income measures the respondents’ income from farming, fishing and 
forestry.  Migrants measures the percentage of rural-urban migrants in each village.  Education is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if there is a junior high school located in the village.  
